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Is corporate 
governance a 
modern fantasy?
Andrew Higson discusses the reality of financial reporting and asks if 
corporate governance still has a role to play in the modern business world. 
W hat is the difference between the collapse of Enron and the recent collapse of the banking 
sector? Well, the obvious answer is that 
Enron’s demise was not as significant. 
Yet, in the wake of Enron’s collapse, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was rushed into law 
in the USA in order to cure the perceived 
corporate ills of, and give back credibility to, 
corporate America.  Organisations around 
the world have since spent thousands of 
hours becoming Sarbanes-Oxley compliant 
in order to be able to continue trading with 
companies in the USA. 
At the centre of Sarbanes-Oxley was 
its focus on strengthening corporate 
governance procedures to prevent fraud 
and mismanagement – but the chaos in 
the banking sector must raise a question 
over the success of Sarbanes-Oxley and, 
more significantly, over the whole idea of 
corporate governance.  
Driving forces
The prime responsibility for any business 
failure must rest with its top management. 
So what caused management to get things 
so wrong? Management’s motivations 
provide the driving force behind the way 
financial statements (often viewed as the 
public face of an organisation’s indication of 
performance) are prepared and presented. 
These motivations may range from 
meeting profit targets (so as to satisfy City 
expectations or earn personal bonuses) to 
ensuring the survival of the business. The 
rewards for hitting these short-term targets 
may merely reinforce this behaviour. 
Motivational aspects permeate the whole 
way in which an organisation is run and the 
way in which its results are presented to 
the outside world. So where does this leave 
the non-executive directors? One of the 
main elements in the recent development 
of corporate governance has been the 
growth in the use of non-executive 
directors. One of their roles is to challenge 
and contribute to the development of the 
company’s strategy. It is clear from the 
collapse in the banking sector that the non-
executives were unable to limit the actions 
of management. This sudden collapse can 
be seen to have arisen from the actions and 
motivations of senior managers rather than 
from failures in internal controls – which 
were a primary focus of Sarbanes-Oxley.
The assessment of corporate 
performance is an important part of 
corporate governance. The problem is how 
to judge corporate performance – and its 
associated risks.
Financial reporting
Financial statements are often, 
unquestioningly, taken as a fundamental 
indicator of corporate performance. But 
what do they really show, and what is their 
purpose? In the UK during the 1990s there 
was the ‘statement of principles’ debate, 
where the accounting standard-setters 
focused on the decision-usefulness of 
financial statements – to which their critics 
objected. Decision-usefulness, however, 
won through, with its emphasis on the 
relevance and reliability of the data in the 
financial statements to enable users to take 
economic decisions, and its downplaying 
of the fundamental accounting concepts (a 
key one being prudence). 
This was not the only change. As a result 
of the primacy of the needs of users, the 
focus of the financial statements moved 
from the income statement (emphasising 
income and expenditure) to the balance 
sheet (with the emphasis on the assets and 
liability approach). The consequence has 
been the rise of comprehensive income, 
with its focus on fair values and mark-
to-market accounting. So a profession 
that had been noted for prudence and 
conservatism was suddenly at the forefront 
of innovative financial disclosure. Whilst 
it could be argued that the ‘prudent’ 
approach may have understated corporate 
performance, it probably limited the risks 
associated with the financial figures. The 
comprehensive income approach attempts 
to ‘capture’ financial performance in a wider 
sense, but has probably increased the risks 
associated with the financial data – a factor 
that does not seem to have received much 
attention.  
The recent focus of the standard-setters 
on unspecified users taking unspecified 
decisions, at unspecified times, with 
unspecified success seems to be a dubious 
basis to underpin the production of financial 
reporting standards, and, indeed, there 
is the distinct possibility that standard-
setters are building on shifting sands that 
will not provide a firm foundation for the 
production of a consistent and coherent 
set of standards. Consequently, there is a 
danger is that financial statements may 
mean all things to all people – with an 
overreliance on external auditors ‘to see that 
things are right’.
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external auditors
What are the implications for the external 
auditors? One presumes that the external 
auditor’s report would imply that the 
financial statements were ‘fit for purpose’. 
However, the focus on decision-usefulness 
has not been endorsed by them – the audit 
report says nothing about this. Indeed, 
following the Bannerman case in 2002, 
some auditors in the UK added a paragraph 
to their audit reports specifically to deny 
liability for users taking decisions based on 
financial statements audited by them. 
Also, decision-usefulness was not 
endorsed by the UK Company Law Review 
Report in 2001. Therefore, we have a 
situation where the standard-setters 
are saying that the objective of financial 
statements is decision-usefulness, yet this 
stance seems to have limited support from 
those who have given this issue serious 
consideration (other than some vocal users 
of the financial statements). 
Both accounting and auditing are 
often considered to be technical subjects. 
However, this perception of technical 
precision tends to underestimate the 
complexities of external reporting and the 
real nature of the management-auditor 
relationship. As has already been noted, 
management are keenly interested in the 
picture that is portrayed in the financial 
statements. The very nature of financial 
reporting means that a whole multitude 
of judgments and estimates have to 
be made during the compilation of the 
statements – hence the potential for 
bias. If management intend to smooth 
profits, even auditors admit that this is 
very difficult to detect. The treatment of 
an item in the financial statements may be 
acceptable, questionable or unacceptable, 
depending on the motivations behind it. 
Perhaps, therefore, the external audit 
should be viewed in the context of the audit 
of management’s motivations – and there 
should be questions over whether the 
financial statements are really free from bias. 
When it comes to fraud, the classification 
of an action often depends on the 
motivations behind it (e.g. was it deliberate 
or accidental?). So at what point does bias 
become fraud? The dividing line between 
the two, in certain circumstances, may at 
the very least be very fine. Often it is the 
passage of time that makes things clear –  
a luxury the external auditors frequently do 
not have.
the financial reporting 
expectations gap
In terms of assessing corporate 
performance, the external auditors say 
nothing about corporate or management 
performance. Nor do they comment on 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
in their audit reports – or the associated 
risks. This raises the question that, if the 
auditors says nothing about these things, 
how are the users expected to form their 
own opinions?  If one thinks about the 
word ‘performance’ in a theatrical sense, it 
could be defined as ‘an act of make-believe 
aimed at enchanting an audience’. I am 
sure we can all think of situations where 
this description would be applicable to 
various organisations’ financial statements! 
There has been much discussion of 
the audit expectations gap. Indeed, it 
has been a driving force behind the 
expansion of the audit report in the 
early 1990s and has focused the debate 
about the responsibilities of the auditor. 
Compared to the recognition given to the 
audit expectations gap, the possibility of 
a financial reporting expectations gap 
comprising an audit expectations gap and 
a financial statement expectations gap 
has almost been ignored. The inability 
to communicate the limitations of the 
financial statements and the preoccupation 
of the accounting standard-setters with 
satisfying user needs may be central to 
this financial statements expectations 
gap. Simply attempting to tackle the 
audit expectations gap whilst ignoring 
the financial statements expectations gap 
would seem to be doomed to failure.
the future
The last couple of decades have seen an 
increasing focus on corporate governance. 
Whilst there have been some criticisms 
of individual aspects of corporate 
governance, in general there seems to 
have been a consensus regarding its 
importance and desirability. However, I 
would suggest that the current situation 
requires a fundamental review of the 
nature of corporate governance and its 
relationship with financial reporting. With 
the collapse of the banking sector, I would 
suggest that it is difficult to think of any 
greater condemnation of the current 
system of corporate governance – a system 
that had been specifically ‘strengthened’ 
following the collapse of Enron. The 
situation has not been helped by the 
accountancy profession’s inability to be 
clear about the scope and limitations of 
the financial statements in the age of the 
knowledge economy. One has to start to 
consider the possibility that organisations 
are becoming too large and too complex 
to be effectively controlled and monitored 
and that corporate governance may in fact 
be a modern fantasy.
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